#758 Split `NetworkGraph` message handling fns into unsigned and signed (+update bindings)

Merged Matt Corallo TheBlueMatt

@@ -121,52 +121,20 @@
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121 121
122 122
impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
123 123
	fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
124 -
		self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
124 +
		self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
125 +
		Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty())
125 126
	}
126 127
127 128
	fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
128 -
		if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
129 -
			return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
130 -
		}
131 -
132 -
		let utxo_value = match &self.chain_access {
133 -
			&None => {
134 -
				// Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
135 -
				None
136 -
			},
137 -
			&Some(ref chain_access) => {
138 -
				match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
139 -
					Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
140 -
						let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
141 -
						                                    .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
142 -
						                                    .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
143 -
						                                    .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
144 -
						                                    .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
145 -
						if script_pubkey != expected_script {
146 -
							return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
147 -
						}
148 -
						//TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
149 -
						//to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
150 -
						Some(value)
151 -
					},
152 -
					Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
153 -
						return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.contents.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
154 -
					},
155 -
					Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
156 -
						return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
157 -
					},
158 -
				}
159 -
			},
160 -
		};
161 -
		let result = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, utxo_value, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
129 +
		self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
162 130
		log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
163 -
		result
131 +
		Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
164 132
	}
165 133
166 134
	fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
167 135
		match update {
168 136
			&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
169 -
				let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
137 +
				let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
170 138
			},
171 139
			&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
172 140
				self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
@@ -178,7 +146,8 @@
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178 146
	}
179 147
180 148
	fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
181 -
		self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
149 +
		self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
150 +
		Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
182 151
	}
183 152
184 153
	fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
@@ -562,39 +531,47 @@
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562 531
		}
563 532
	}
564 533
565 -
	/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a given node announcement.
534 +
	/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
535 +
	/// given node announcement.
566 536
	///
567 537
	/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
568 538
	/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
569 -
	/// routing messages without checking their signatures.
570 -
	///
571 -
	/// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
572 -
	pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<T>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
573 -
		if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
574 -
			let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
575 -
			secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
576 -
		}
539 +
	/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
540 +
	pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
541 +
		let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
542 +
		secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
543 +
		self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
544 +
	}
545 +
546 +
	/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
547 +
	/// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
548 +
	/// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
549 +
	/// peers.
550 +
	pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
551 +
		self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
552 +
	}
577 553
578 -
		match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
554 +
	fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
555 +
		match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
579 556
			None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
580 557
			Some(node) => {
581 558
				if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
582 -
					if node_info.last_update  >= msg.contents.timestamp {
559 +
					if node_info.last_update  >= msg.timestamp {
583 560
						return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
584 561
					}
585 562
				}
586 563
587 -
				let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty();
564 +
				let should_relay = msg.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.excess_address_data.is_empty();
588 565
				node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
589 -
					features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
590 -
					last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
591 -
					rgb: msg.contents.rgb,
592 -
					alias: msg.contents.alias,
593 -
					addresses: msg.contents.addresses.clone(),
594 -
					announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
566 +
					features: msg.features.clone(),
567 +
					last_update: msg.timestamp,
568 +
					rgb: msg.rgb,
569 +
					alias: msg.alias,
570 +
					addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
571 +
					announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
595 572
				});
596 573
597 -
				Ok(should_relay)
574 +
				Ok(())
598 575
			}
599 576
		}
600 577
	}
@@ -603,44 +580,84 @@
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603 580
	///
604 581
	/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
605 582
	/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
606 -
	/// routing messages without checking their signatures.
583 +
	/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
607 584
	///
608 -
	/// If the channel has been confirmed to exist on chain (with correctly-formatted scripts on
609 -
	/// chain), set utxo_value to the value of the output on chain, otherwise leave it as None.
610 -
	/// The UTXO value is then used in routing calculation if we have no better information on the
611 -
	/// maximum HTLC value that can be sent over the channel.
612 -
	///
613 -
	/// Further, setting utxo_value to Some indicates that the announcement message is genuine,
614 -
	/// allowing us to update existing channel data in the case of reorgs or to replace bogus
615 -
	/// channel data generated by a DoS attacker.
585 +
	/// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
586 +
	/// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
587 +
	pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
588 +
			(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
589 +
			-> Result<(), LightningError>
590 +
			where C::Target: chain::Access {
591 +
		let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
592 +
		secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
593 +
		secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
594 +
		secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
595 +
		secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
596 +
		self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
597 +
	}
598 +
599 +
	/// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
600 +
	/// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
601 +
	/// channel announcement to any of our peers.
616 602
	///
617 -
	/// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
618 -
	pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_value: Option<u64>, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<T>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
619 -
		if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
620 -
			return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
621 -
		}
603 +
	/// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
604 +
	/// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
605 +
	pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
606 +
			(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
607 +
			-> Result<(), LightningError>
608 +
			where C::Target: chain::Access {
609 +
		self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
610 +
	}
622 611
623 -
		if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
624 -
			let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
625 -
			secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
626 -
			secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
627 -
			secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
628 -
			secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
612 +
	fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
613 +
			(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
614 +
			-> Result<(), LightningError>
615 +
			where C::Target: chain::Access {
616 +
		if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
617 +
			return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
629 618
		}
630 619
631 -
		let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty();
620 +
		let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
621 +
			&None => {
622 +
				// Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
623 +
				None
624 +
			},
625 +
			&Some(ref chain_access) => {
626 +
				match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
627 +
					Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
628 +
						let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
629 +
						                                    .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
630 +
						                                    .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
631 +
						                                    .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
632 +
						                                    .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
633 +
						if script_pubkey != expected_script {
634 +
							return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
635 +
						}
636 +
						//TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
637 +
						//to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
638 +
						Some(value)
639 +
					},
640 +
					Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
641 +
						return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
642 +
					},
643 +
					Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
644 +
						return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
645 +
					},
646 +
				}
647 +
			},
648 +
		};
632 649
633 650
		let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
634 -
				features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
635 -
				node_one: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
651 +
				features: msg.features.clone(),
652 +
				node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
636 653
				one_to_two: None,
637 -
				node_two: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
654 +
				node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
638 655
				two_to_one: None,
639 656
				capacity_sats: utxo_value,
640 -
				announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
657 +
				announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.is_empty() { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
641 658
			};
642 659
643 -
		match self.channels.entry(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
660 +
		match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
644 661
			BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
645 662
				//TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
646 663
				//in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
@@ -654,7 +671,7 @@
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654 671
					// b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
655 672
					//    get reorg'd out.
656 673
					// c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
657 -
					Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
674 +
					Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
658 675
					*entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
659 676
				} else {
660 677
					return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
@@ -669,11 +686,11 @@
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669 686
			( $node_id: expr ) => {
670 687
				match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
671 688
					BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
672 -
						node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.contents.short_channel_id);
689 +
						node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
673 690
					},
674 691
					BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
675 692
						node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
676 -
							channels: vec!(msg.contents.short_channel_id),
693 +
							channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
677 694
							lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
678 695
							announcement_info: None,
679 696
						});
@@ -682,10 +699,10 @@
Loading
682 699
			};
683 700
		}
684 701
685 -
		add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
686 -
		add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
702 +
		add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
703 +
		add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
687 704
688 -
		Ok(should_relay)
705 +
		Ok(())
689 706
	}
690 707
691 708
	/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
@@ -717,22 +734,32 @@
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717 734
		}
718 735
	}
719 736
720 -
	/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions of a channel.
737 +
	/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
738 +
	/// of the channel.
721 739
	///
722 740
	/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
723 741
	/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
724 -
	/// routing messages without checking their signatures.
725 -
	///
726 -
	/// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
727 -
	pub fn update_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
742 +
	/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
743 +
	pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
744 +
		self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
745 +
	}
746 +
747 +
	/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
748 +
	/// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
749 +
	/// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
750 +
	pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
751 +
		self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
752 +
	}
753 +
754 +
	fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
728 755
		let dest_node_id;
729 -
		let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
756 +
		let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
730 757
		let chan_was_enabled;
731 758
732 -
		match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
759 +
		match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
733 760
			None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
734 761
			Some(channel) => {
735 -
				if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.contents.htlc_maximum_msat {
762 +
				if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
736 763
					if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
737 764
						return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
738 765
					}
@@ -748,47 +775,43 @@
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748 775
				macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
749 776
					( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
750 777
						if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
751 -
							if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
778 +
							if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
752 779
								return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
753 780
							}
754 781
							chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
755 782
						} else {
756 783
							chan_was_enabled = false;
757 784
						}
758 785
759 -
						let last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
760 -
							Some(msg.clone())
761 -
						} else {
762 -
							None
763 -
						};
786 +
						let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.is_empty() { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
764 787
765 788
						let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
766 789
							enabled: chan_enabled,
767 -
							last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
768 -
							cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
769 -
							htlc_minimum_msat: msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
770 -
							htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.contents.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
790 +
							last_update: msg.timestamp,
791 +
							cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
792 +
							htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
793 +
							htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
771 794
							fees: RoutingFees {
772 -
								base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
773 -
								proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
795 +
								base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
796 +
								proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
774 797
							},
775 798
							last_update_message
776 799
						};
777 800
						$target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
778 801
					}
779 802
				}
780 803
781 -
				let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
782 -
				if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
804 +
				let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
805 +
				if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
783 806
					dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
784 -
					if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
785 -
						secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_two);
807 +
					if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
808 +
						secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
786 809
					}
787 810
					maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
788 811
				} else {
789 812
					dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
790 -
					if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
791 -
						secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_one);
813 +
					if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
814 +
						secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
792 815
					}
793 816
					maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
794 817
				}
@@ -797,8 +820,8 @@
Loading
797 820
798 821
		if chan_enabled {
799 822
			let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
800 -
			let mut base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
801 -
			let mut proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
823 +
			let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
824 +
			let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
802 825
			if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
803 826
				base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
804 827
				proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
@@ -832,7 +855,7 @@
Loading
832 855
			node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
833 856
		}
834 857
835 -
		Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
858 +
		Ok(())
836 859
	}
837 860
838 861
	fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
@@ -1178,8 +1201,8 @@
Loading
1178 1201
		unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1179 1202
		msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1180 1203
		let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1181 -
			node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1182 -
			node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1204 +
			node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1205 +
			node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1183 1206
			bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1184 1207
			bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1185 1208
			contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),

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Changes in lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
-2
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Files Coverage
lightning/src +<.01% 91.41%
Project Totals (37 files) 91.41%
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